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COMMENTS
SECTION 302(c)(2): OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS
MICHAEL A. JONES
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 302 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) involves
the potential tax treatment of corporate stock redemptions.' The
1. I.R.C. §§ 302(a)-(b) states:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-If a corporatioh redeems its stock (within the mean-
ing of section 317(b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection (b) ap-
plies, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in
exchange for the stock.
(b) REDEMPTIONS TREATED AS EXCHANGES.-
(1) REDEMPTIONS NOT EQUIVALENT TO DIVI-
DENDS.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the redemption is not essentially
equivalent to a dividend.
(2) SUBSTANTIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE REDEMPTION OF
STOCK.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the distribution
is substantially disproportionate with respect to the shareholder.
(B) LIMITATION.-This paragraph shall not apply unless imme-
diately after the redemption the shareholder owns less than 50 per-
cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock enti-
tled to vote.
(C) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this paragraph, the distribu-
tion is substantially disproportionate if-
(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder immediately after the redemption bears to
all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time, is less
than 80 percent of-
(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned
by the shareholder immediately before the redemption bears
to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time.
For the purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated
as substantially disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership
of the common stock of the corporation (whether voting or nonvot-
ing) after and before redemption also meets the 80 percent require-
ment of the preceding sentence. For purposes of the preceding sen-
tence, if there is more than one class of common stock, the
determinations shall be made by reference to fair market value.
(D) SERIES OF REDEMPTIONS.-This paragraph shall not ap-
ply to any redemption made pursuant to a plan the purpose or effect
of which is a series of redemptions resulting in a distribution which
(in the aggregate) is not substantially disproportionate with respect
to the shareholder.
(3) TERMINATION OF SHAREHOLDER'S INTEREST.-Subsection
(a) shall apply if the redemption is in complete redemption of all of the
stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder.
(4) STOCK ISSUED BY RAILROAD CORPORATIONS IN CERTAIN
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general rule is that such redemptions will be characterized as stock
exchanges if the conditions of section 302(a) and (b) are met. If
these conditions are not met, the redemptions will be treated as
dividend distributions. The classification of a stock redemption
under section 302 is of vital importance to the taxpayer since char-
acterization as an exchange paves the way for profitable capital
gains treatment2 while categorization as a dividend distribution re-
sults in ordinary income tax liability.
Section 302 classification is complicated by the requirement that
the family attribution rules of section 318(a) apply in determining
stock ownership for section 302 purposes.3 The family attribution
rules of section 318(a) specify that a redeemed shareholder will be
attributed constructive ownership of any stock owned by his
spouse, children and grandchildren. Under section 302(b)(3) the
redeemed shareholder's interest in the corporation must be com-
pletely terminated for a stock exchange classification. The con-
structive ownership rule would seem to indicate that a redeemed
shareholder whose family owned even one share of stock in the re-
deeming corporation could never meet this condition. Section
302(c)(2), however, provides an important exception to the general
application of the family attribution rules.5 This section states that
REORGANIZATIONS.-Subsection (a) shall apply if the redemption is of
stock issued by a railroad corporation (as defined in section 77(m) of the
Bankruptcy Act, as amended) pursuant to a plan of reorganization under
section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act.
(5) APPLICATION OF PARAGRAPHS.-In determining whether a re-
demption meets the requirements of paragraph (1), the fact that such re-
demption fails to meet the requirements of paragraph (2), (3), or (4) shall
not be taken into account. If a redemption meets the requirements of para-
graph (3) and also the requirements of paragraph (1), (2), or (4), then so
much of subsection (c)(2) as would (but for this sentence) apply in respect
of the acquisition of an interest in the corporation within the 10-year pe-
riod beginning on the date of the distribution shall not apply.
2. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1221-1223.
3. I.R.C. § 302(c)(1).
4. I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A) provides generally that an individual shall be considered as own-
ing the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for his spouse, children, grandchildren, or
parents.
5. I.R.C. § 302(c) states:
(c) CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this sub-
section, section 318(a) shall apply in determining the ownership of stock for
purposes of this section.
(2) FOR DETERMINING TERMINATION OF INTEREST.-
(A) In the case of a distribution described in subsection (b)(3),
section 318(a)(1) shall not apply if-
(i) immediately after the distribution the distributee has
OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS
the family attribution rules are inapplicable if certain other condi-
tions are fulfilled by the taxpayer, both prior and subsequent to
the redemption.
This comment will deal with the section 302(c)(2) exception, its
conditions, and the varying constructions placed upon the excep-
tion by the courts and the Internal Revenue Service (the Service).
II. SECTION 302(c)(2)(A)(i)
Section 302(c)(2)(A) prescribes three conditions necessary to
no interest in the corporation (including an interest as officer,
director, or employee), other than an interest as creditor.
(ii) the distributee does not acquire any such interest
(other than stock acquired by bequest or inheritance) within
10 years from the date of such distribution, and
(iii) the distributee, at such time and in such manner as
the Secretary by regulations prescribes, files an agreement to
notify the Secretary of any acquisition described in clause (ii)
and to retain such records as may be necessary for the applica-
tion of this paragraph.
If the distributee acquires such an interest in the corporation (other than by
bequest or inheritance) within 10 years from the date of the distribution, then the
periods of limitation provided in sections 6501 and 6502 on the making of an as-
sessment and the collection by levy or a proceeding in court shall, with respect to
any deficiency (including interest and additions to the tax) resulting from such
acquisition, include one year immediately following the date on which the distri-
butee (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary) notifies the
Secretary of such acquisition; and such assessment and collection may be made
notwithstanding any provision of law oi rule of law which otherwise would prevent
such assessment and collection.
(B) Subparagraph (A) of this paragraph shall not apply if-
(i) any portion of the stock redeemed was acquired, di-
rectly or indirectly, within the 10-year period ending on the
date of the distribution by the distributee from a person the
ownership of whose stock would (at the time of distribution)
be attributable to the distributee under section 318(a), or
(ii) any person owns (at the time of the distribution) stock
the ownership of which is attributable to the distributee under
section 318(a) and such person acquired any stock in the cor-
poration, directly or indirectly from the distributee within the
10-year period ending on the date of the distribution, unless
such stock so acquired from the distributee is redeemed in the
same transaction.
The preceding sentence shall not apply if the acquisition (or, in the case of clause
(ii), the disposition) by the distributee did not have as one of its principal pur-
poses the avoidance of federal income tax.
6. If I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) requirements are not met, the stock redemption will not
automatically be disqualified as a complete redemption under § 302(b)(3) if the distributee
can show that the stock was not acquired, or disposed of, for the principal purpose of in-
come tax avoidance. See, the flush language following § 302(c)(2)(B)(ii).
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waive the family attribution rules of section 318(a)(1). The first
condition requires the distributee to be free from any interest in
the redeeming corporation immediately after the redemption. One
exception is allowed. A distributee may retain an interest as a
creditor after the redemption.7 The purpose of the creditor excep-
tion is to permit credit sales of redeemed stock, rather than requir-
ing each redemption to be for cash.
According to section 302(c)(2)(A)(i), a distributee may not retain
an interest as an officer, director, or employee.8 Many other types
of interests, however, are discussed and prohibited in the revenue
rulings and cases. For example, the Service in Revenue Ruling 70-
104 held that a father's interest in a family corporation was not
terminated following a stock redemption when he entered into a
long-term contract to perform consultant and advisory services for
the corporation.9 The Service stated "the performance by the fa-
ther of services pursuant to the consulting agreement is an 'inter-
est in the corporation' within the meaning of section
302(c)(2)(A)(i) of the Code." 10 Accordingly, the termination of in-
terest condition was not met, and the father's entire redemption
was taxed as a dividend under section 301. Similarly, in Revenue
Ruling 74-416, a distributee continued to hold a forbidden interest
in a corporation by retaining as a trustee the right to vote corpo-
rate stock held by the trust.11 Finally, in Revenue Ruling 59-119, a
corporation entered into a credit arrangement requiring 32 quar-
terly installment payments for the redeemed stock.1 2 The distribu-
tee in that ruling wanted to appoint a voting representative to the
board of directors of the corporation to insure corporate adherence
to conditions of the agreement. s The Service ruled that the ap-
7. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i) states that "immediately after the distribution the distributee
[must have] no interest in the corporation (including an interest as officer, director, or em-
ployee), other than an interest as a creditor," while § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) requires that the dis-
tributee not acquire such an interest within ten years after the distribution. Note that §
302(c)(2)(A)(i) looks at the interests held by the distributee immediately following the
distribution.
8. See note 5 supra. See also Levin v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 258 (1966), in which the
redeeming shareholder, who was the mother of the remaining shareholders, remained as a
director "out of respect and sentiment." She received a nominal $1,200 annual salary. The
court found she had retained a forbidden interest and applied the family attribution rules,
thus turning her stock redemption proceeds from capital gains into dividend income of over
$98,000. Id. at 260.
9. 1970-1 C.B. 66.
10. Id.
11. 1971-2 C.B. 173.
12. 1959-1 C.B. 68. Note that a creditor status is allowed by I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i).
13. The stock redemption agreement prescribed, among other requirements that:
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pointment by the distributee of a representative to the board of
directors would constitute a forbidden interest, as the nominee di-
rector would be acting solely on the distributee's behalf and would
in effect be his agent."
In short, section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) requires a total severance of any
connection with the firm's operation which might permit the dis-
tributee to protect his self-interest.'" Many court cases construing
this section are inconsistent with the holdings of the revenue rul-
ings. For example, the Tax Court distinguished Estate of Lennard
v. Commissioner from Revenue Ruling 70-104, despite the factual
similarities to that ruling.' 6 Lennard was the founder, director, and
secretary-treasurer of a metal brokerage corporation. The presi-
dent and major shareholder of the corporation was Lennard's son.
Lennard's redemption of his corporate stock called for the issuance
of a $150,000 subordinated promissory note.'7 After the redemp-
tion, Lennard joined an accounting firm as managing partner of
the corporation's account. In this capacity, he continued to per-
form the same accounting services for the corporation as he had
before the redemption.' 8 Despite the continuity of Lennard's con-
nections with the corporation, the court concluded that Lennard
had only retained a creditor interest.' 9
Revenue Ruling 70-104 involved a parent stockholder who en-
tered into a long-term consultant contract with the redeeming cor-
poration. The Service held that the consulting constituted a for-
[Sbo long as the corporation owes funds to such shareholder it will not, without
first receiving the written consent of the shareholder, declare dividends; pay sala-
ries in excess of a certain amount to officers; sell its assets except in the ordinary
course of business; or engage in a reorganization, recapitalization, merger, consoli-
dation or liquidation.
1959-1 C.B. at 69.
14. Id. at 70.
15. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-254, 1976-2 C.B. 332.
16. 61 T.C. 554 (1974).
17. Petitioners claimed the note was subordinated so that the corporation would not be
compelled to report the indebtedness to its bankers. It is interesting to note that of the
$275,000 sales price, $125,000 was paid in cash in October 1965, and the subordinated prom-
issory note for $150,000 was paid in January 1966, despite the fact that during the entire
three-month period the corporation possessed sufficient funds to pay off the debt. Id. at 557,
563.
18. During this period, Lennard performed monthly audits, filed corporate tax returns,
advised his son on a major acquisition, was named trustee of the corporation's pension plan,
and worked closely with the new secretary-treasurer, who had replaced Lennard in the cor-
porate hierarchy. After Lennard's death, the corporation did not retain an accountant to
perform a monthly audit. Id. at 558.
19. Id. at 563.
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bidden interest. The Lennard court avoided a forbidden interest
ruling by classifying Lennard as an independent contractor, whose
services could be terminated at any time. Evidently, the Lennard
court ignored the factual similarities between Lennard and Reve-
nue Ruling 70-104.20 Instead the court focused on the corporate
president's ostensible autonomy, disregarding the impact that Len-
nard's advice may have had on his son's decisions.
In an earlier case the Tax Court had also sidestepped the reve-
nue rulings. In Lewis v. Commissioner, Lewis transferred control of
his automobile dealership to his sons through a series of redemp-
tions extending over a five-year period.2' Lewis continued to serve
on the board of directors as vice president of the corporation.22 Al-
though Lewis "neither performed any services for the corporation
nor actively exercised any powers as vice president or director," he
did attend informal meetings of the board of directors and "from
time to time inquired generally how business was progressing."23
Lewis subsequently resigned as vice president and director several
weeks after the last redemption was paid. The court avoided the
retention of interest question by holding the redemptions were not
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" under section 302(b)(1). 24 By
emphasizing the five-year redemption process, instead of the re-
sulting termination of interest, the court avoided application of
section 302(b)(3) and the family attribution exception of section
302(c)(2). Had the court reached the family attribution question, it
would have been hard pressed to rule that Lewis did not retain a
forbidden interest under section 302(c)(2)(A)(i), which specifically
prohibits retention of an interest as an officer, director, or
employee. 5
20. "It is our view that the success of the corporation was directly attributable to the
efforts of [Lennard's son] rather than to the services provided by [Lennard] as accountant."
Id. at 562.
21. 47 T.C. 129 (1966).
22. Lewis was elected vice president at the same meeting in which he resigned as presi-
dent. Id. at 131.
23. Id.
24, Id. at 135; I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) states that a stock redemption shall be treated as an
exchange, if the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend. See generally, Note,
I.R.C. § 302(b)(1): Dividend Equivalency After United States v. Davis, 7 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 505 (1979).
The court in Lewis ignored any application of the § 318 family attribution rules despite
previous holdings utilizing § 318 in § 302(b)(1) cases. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Commissioner,
39 T.C. 199 (1962); Lewis v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 71 (1960).
25. The court foresaw the problem: "At the very least, this raises the suspicion that his
continuation in these posts, while he was receiving payments, had some significance." 47
T.C. at 135. But see Judge Simpson's concurring opinion:
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The lesson of Lennard and Lewis is that form can rule over sub-
stance when dealing with section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) if the court is so
inclined. An alert taxpayer can meet the termination of interest
requirement of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) in spite of clear revenue rul-
ings to the contrary 8 or can avoid the effect of the attribution
rules of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) altogether, if: (1) enough superflu-
ous ties are severed and job titles are changed, as in the Lennard
case; or if (2) sufficient emphasis is shifted from the result of the
redemption to the timing and type of redemption, as in the Lewis
case.
As previously stated, a distributee may maintain a creditor in-
terest in the redeeming corporation without risking his exemption
from the family attribution rules. The only treasury regulation
construing this section states "[ffor the purpose of section
302(c)(2)(A)(i), a person will be considered to be a creditor only if
the rights of such person with respect to the corporation are not
greater or broader in scope than necessary for the enforcement of
his claim.""7 The regulation goes on to state that the claim must
not be in any sense proprietary, 8 must not be subordinated to the
claims of general creditors, and that an obligation, even in the
form of a debt, may sometimes constitute a proprietary interest. 9
The relevant revenue rulings are sparse and essentially echo the
treasury regulation."0
As I read section 302(c)(2)(A)(i), it does not provide that every officer or director
shall be treated as having retained an interest in a corporation. It provides merely
that a retained interest may include an interest as an officer or director, but it
does not require us to find that every officer or director has retained an interest.
Id. at 137 (emphasis in original).
Note, however, the next year, in Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967), the
court of appeals refused to waive the family attribution rules of § 318 when the distributee,
who was the mother of the remaining shareholders, continued as an officer and director at a
nominal salary "out of respect."
26. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-119, 1959-1 C.B. 68; Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 C.B. 66.
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(d) (1978).
28. "Proprietary" has yet to be defined by the Internal Revenue Service.
29. Tress. Reg. § 1.302-4(d) (1978) provides:
For example, if under the terms of the instrument the corporation may discharge
the principal amount of its obligation to a person by payments, the amount or
certainty of which are dependent upon the earnings of the corporation, such a
person is not a creditor of the corporation. Furthermore, if under the terms of the
instrument the rate of purported interest is dependent upon earnings, the holder
of such instrument may not, in some cases, be a creditor.
30. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-467, 1977-2 C.B. 92, in which a taxpayer had his stock re-
deemed by a family corporation, terminating his entire interest in the corporation. He then
resigned as president of the corporation, but continued to receive payments, not dependent
on the corporation's future earnings or subordinated to the corporation's general creditors,
1980]
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Generally, Tax Court cases interpreting section 302(c)(2)(A)(i)
do not reach the creditor exception issue because of the termina-
tion of interest prerequisite of section 302(b)(3). If a distributee
receives an interest greater than that of a creditor, the interest is
classified as an equity interest which fails the termination of inter-
est test of section 302(b)(3). Consequently, the failure to meet the
termination of interest test renders moot the question of creditor
status under section 302(c)(2)(A)(i). 1
Courts which have reached the creditor exception issue have en-
countered much difficulty in distinguishing debt from equity. 2 No
treasury regulation, revenue ruling, or Code section defines either
debt or equity. 3 Consequently, all criteria used to decide the debt
or equity question comes from the courts or from academia. 4
In Dunn v. Commissioner,8 Mrs. Dunn, who owned shares in a
corporation which held a General Motors franchise, redeemed her
shares pursuant to an agreement which provided for a twelve-year
pay out of the redemption price. This agreement was subject to
certain restrictions required by General Motors as a condition of
the corporation retaining the franchise." One year after payments
as rent for the corporation's use of a building owned by him. The Service found the pay-
ments represented an "arm's length charge" and did not provide the distributee with an
interest greater than that of a creditor.
31. See, e.g.., Niedermeyer v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974).
32. See, e.g., Dunn v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 715 (1978); Estate of Lennard v. Commis-
sioner, 61 T.C. 554 (1974).
33. Recently the Service reduced further the flow of information. Rev. Proc. 77-45, 1977-
2 C.B. 579 states that advance rulings or determination letters will not be issued on
whether section 302(b) applies to a redemption of stock if after the redemption
the distributing corporation uses property that is owned by the shareholder from
whom the stock is redeemed and the payments by the corporation for the use of
the property are dependent upon the corporation's future earnings or subordinate
to the claims of the corporation's general creditors.
34. There are many cases dealing with the debt-equity question. See, e.g., Nassau Lens
Co. v. Commissoner, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962); Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d
729 (9th Cir. 1956); Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956);
Lisle v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 627 (1976); Nye v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 203
(1968).
See also Eustice, Corporations and Corporate Investors, 25 TAX L. REV. 509 (1970); Hors-
ley, When IRS Treats Debt as Equity Widespread Tax Problems Can Result, 29 J. TAX 78
(1968); Stone, Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the Corporation and Its
Shareholders, 42 TULANE L. REV. 251 (1968).
35. 70 T.C. 715 (1978).
36. The restrictions included: (1) the corporation would not be required to make any
payment which would reduce its "owned net working capital" below whatever amount was
required by its franchise agreement or would prevent the corporation from retaining 50% of
the previous year's net profits after taxes; (2) if any payment of any installment would vio-
late said provisions, the due date of such installment would be postponed until such time as
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had begun, the franchise encountered financial difficulties and
Mrs. Dunn was not paid any interest in that year. Over the next
six years, both principal and interest payments were sometimes re-
ceived late, some as late as five months after the due date.3 De-
spite the fluctuations in amounts paid and time of payment, the
court held that Mrs. Dunn had met the termination of interest re-
quirement of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i). 8 The court disposed of the
true indicators of a creditor relationship, regular principal and in-
terest payments, in an offhand manner, noting: "The mere fact
that [Mrs. Dunn] may not have been paid while other creditors
were is not sufficient in and of itself to constitute subordination."' 09
Finally, the court stated that the inclusion of restrictions on pay-
ment, when imposed by an independent third party, is simply one
factor to consider in determining if a distributee has retained an
interest "other than an interest as a creditor."' 0 In Lennard v.
Commissioner, as noted earlier, the taxpayer redeemed his stock
and accepted a subordinated note as payment. The court deter-
mined that a subordinated promissory note did not destroy Len-
nard's creditor status because subordination was but one of several
factors to be considered. The Tax Court stated that the prohibi-
tion against subordination had to be read in conjunction with the
prohibition against a proprietary interest.'1
it could be made without violating the provisions; (3) the corporation could not take any
action such as excessive purchases, declaring or paying dividends, increases in other's sala-
ries or abnormal increases in indebtedness which would affect its ability to make timely
payments to Mrs. Dunn; and (4) the corporation was to borrow against life insurance poli-
cies on Mrs. Dunn's life owned by it in order to make the first two payments. Id. at 723.
37. Id. at 724.
38. Id. at 729.
39. Id. at 727. "First, with the exception of the June 1971 payment, interest payments
were made regularly, albeit the 1975 and 1976 payments were a few months late. Moreover,
although principal payments were running about a year behind, they were being made on a
fairly regular basis." Id.
The court also seemed to place great importance on the fact that some payments were
made in excess of the amounts permitted by the agreement stipulated by General Motors
Corporation. Id.
40. Id. at 729.
41. 61 T.C. at 554. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(d) (1978) states: "Such claim must not in any
sense be proprietary and must not be subordinate to the claims of general creditors. An
obligation in the form of a debt may thus constitute a proprietary interest."
Additionally, the Lennard court cites John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521
(1946), a case dealing with the question of whether certain corporate payments were interest
or dividends. The Supreme Court in Kelley essentially dodges the question by stating
"These cases now under consideration deal with well understood words as used in the tax
statutes-interest and dividends. They need no further definition... .The Tax Court is
fitted to decide whether the annual payments under these corporation obligations are to be
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The results of Dunn and Lennard allow a distributee to escape
the family attribution rules without truly severing all corporate in-
terests. Treasury Regulation section 1.302-4(d) states that interest
payable should not be dependent upon the earnings of the issuing
company. 2 Dunn has applied a gloss to this regulation by holding
"at least where they are imposed by an independent third party,"
restrictions on payment are not determinative of a disguised equity
interest.43 Similarly, the Lennard case, from which the Commis-
sioner recently withdrew his acquiescence, '4 4 allows subordination
of a note if the interest retained through that note is not "proprie-
tary," despite a seemingly clear prohibition as to subordination in
the treasury regulations. 45 Consequently, both cases allow a trans-
fer of stock back to the corporation that is more than a sale of
stock.
Individually, the Lennard and Dunn holdings provide the oppor-
tunity for tax motivated dispositions of stock. The combination of
a subordinated note with noncreditor-type restrictions on the pay-
ments, however, may constitute too many "other factors" to be ig-
nored by the Tax Court. By carefully using the holdings of the Tax
Court as a guide, section 302(b)(3) and section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) can
be used to produce favorable tax consequences in business
transactions."'
classified as interest or dividends." Id. at 530.
Apparently under this sanction of authority, the Tax Court feels it may decide the debt-
equity question without providing any standards or guidelines and without listing the deter-
minative factors or the weights given to them.
42. (1978).
43. 70 T.C. at 729. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(d) (1978) provides that "if under the terms of
the instrument the rate of purported interest is dependent upon earnings, the holder of such
instrument may not, in some cases, be a creditor." Although the Commissioner has not ac-
quiesced to the Dunn holding, Dunn provides some meaning to the "in some cases" excep-
tion of the treasury regulation.
44. 1978-2 C.B. 3. The Service did not state which relationship caused it to remove its
acquiescence. Three separate grounds could have been relied upon: (1) Lennard remained as
trustee of the corporation's pension plan after he redeemed his stock; (2) he continued to
perform accounting services for the corporation after the stock redemption; or (3) the prom-
issory note he received from the corporation was subordinated to general creditors. See Z.
CAVITCH, TAX PLANNING FOR CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 7-44 (Supp. 1979). "The
nonacquiescence is probably a statement by the National Office that the performance of
continued services for a fee, even as an independent contractor, or the subordination of a
note to general creditors ...precludes relief from family attribution."
45. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(d) (1978).
46. For example, W, a wealthy individual, wishes to start his son, X, in a business, but
with minimal tax implications to himself. W buys an 80% interest from Z in a widget fac-
tory and X buys an 11% interest from Z. Later, W redeems all of his shares, taking a low
interest, subordinated note. X gains a controlling interest in the corporation, W pays no gift
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III. SECTION 302(c)(2)(A)(ii)
The second requirement for suspension of the family attribution
rules is provided by section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). That section stipulates
that the redeeming shareholder cannot acquire any interest in the
redeeming corporation within ten years of the date of the distribu-
tion, except by bequest or inheritance.' 7 If the redeemed share-
holder violates this requirement, the original redemption will be
treated as a dividend distribution and taxed accordingly.18
Treasury Regulation section 1.302-2(c) establishes that the ten-
year rule applies to any subsequently acquired interest in the re-
deeming corporation.49 The purpose of the regulation is to prevent
continued control of the redeeming corporation through a related
corporation after redemption. The Service does not define what
degree of corporate ownership is necessary to constitute a related
or a subsidiary corporation." Additionally, the Service fails to pro-
vide any detailed definition of a successor corporation. Revenue
Ruling 76-496, however, does establish general parameters for de-
termining when a corporation is a "successor corporation." 51 In
that revenue ruling, the Service notes: (1) assets were sold by the
redeeming corporation to the distributee at their fair market value
for valid business reasons; (2) remaining business of the redeeming
corporation was substantial in relation to the discontinued busi-
ness; (3) no purchasers of the new division were shareholders in
the redeeming corporation; and (4) none of the tax attributes of
tax and has no serious tax consequences from the small interest payments of the note. X's
corporation can borrow freely, as the large promissory note issued to X is subordinated and
will not be a hindrance in obtaining loans. Should W decide to later forgive the indebted-
ness, he will have effectively delayed the imposition of gift tax.
47. See note 5 supra.
48. The portion of the distribution which is paid from the corporation's "earnings and
profits" is treated as a dividend and included in gross income calculations. I.R.C. § 301(a)-
(c).
49. (1978).
50. The Advisory Group on Subchapter C recommended that Congress enacted a new
subsection which would provide specific statutory authority for a regulation defining subsid-
iaries, parent corporations, and successor corporations. Additionally, the Advisory Group
recommended that a subsidiary be defined as 50% owned, a parent corporation be defined
as owning 50% of the redeeming corporation's stock, and a successor corporation be defined
as any corporation to whom § 381(a) (dealing with the carryover of tax attributes in certain
corporate acquisitions) would apply. SUBCOMMrrrEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, COM-
MITTEE ON WAYS & MEANS, REVISED REPORT ON CORPORATE DIsTmUrIoNS AND ADJUSTMENTS
7 (Dec. 11, 1958) [hereinafter cited as REVISED REPORT].
51. 1976-2 C.B. 93. The facts involved A, who after having all of his shares in X corpora-
tion redeemed by the corporation, purchased a division of the X corporation within ten
years of the redemption. A's son retained a substantial amount of the X stock.
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the redeeming corporation were carried forward with the pur-
chased division.52 There is no indication that continuity of business
purpose or products is an important factor. Conceivably then, if
sale of a division eliminated in-house production of a unique com-
ponent and caused the new corporation purchased by the re-
deemed shareholder to be a major supplier to the redeeming corpo-
ration, a redeemed shareholder could enjoy the advantages of the
suspension of the family attribution rules and still retain a sub-
stantial, though indirect, interest in the operation of the redeeming
corporation. Since the Service essentially adopts a case-by-case
analysis in "successor corporation" situations, it is likely that Rev-
enue Ruling 76-496 would not prove controlling in the hypothetical
instance. It should be noted, however, that the general parameters
established for a successor corporation are insufficient to preclude
the hypothetical as being within the fact pattern of Revenue Rul-
ing 76-496.
A violation of the ten-year rule of section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) occurs
when an interest in the redeeming corporation is acquired, directly
or indirectly, within ten years of the stock redemption. In Revenue
Ruling 75-2, a father and his sons held stock in the same corpora-
tion. The brothers redeemed their stock."3 After their father's
death, the brothers, as executors of his estate, were allowed to vote
the stock held by the estate. During the administration of the es-
tate, one of the brothers became president of the redeeming corpo-
ration. The Service stated, in no uncertain terms, that section
302(c)(2)(A)(ii) specifically prohibits a distributee from acquiring
an interest as an officer, director or employee 4 and that the
brother had violated that section. The Service noted that the
length of time the offending position was held was irrelevant; sec-
tion 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) would have been violated even if the brother
had resigned his position as president immediately following settle-
ment of the estate.55
It is important to note that mere appointment to a trustee posi-
tion will not normally violate the ten-year interest rule of section
302(c)(2)(A)(ii). In Revenue Ruling 72-380, the Service held that
52. Id. at 94.
53. 1975-1 C.B. 99.
54. Id. at 100. The inclusion of "such interest" in § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) incorporates the lan-
guage .of § 302(c)(2)(A)(i) defining those interests.
55. 1975-1 C.B. at 100. The brother remained as president of the corporation after the
estate had been settled and was given all of the outstanding stock of the corporation in the
estate settlement. Id. at 99.
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the estate executor's right to vote stock interests did not violate
the requirement of section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii)." The Service charac-
terized the rights possessed by an executor as comparable to the
rights allowed by the bequest or inheritance exception. Hence, al-
though technically an executor does not acquire his interest by be-
quest or inheritance, the Service stated "it is reasonable to con-
clude that the acquisition under identical circumstances of the
significantly lesser interest embodied in the limited and sharply
circumscribed right of an executor to vote stock in an estate does
not violate section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the Code. ' 7
The ten-year requirement of section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) appears to
be strictly construed by the Service. A distributee should consider
carefully before accepting a position in a corporation which has re-
deemed his stock within the last ten years. He would be well ad-
vised to examine the duties and responsibilities, as well as the po-
tential for discretionary action, inherent in the position. If the
position is one which could affect the corporation's stock, either
through ownership and voting of stock, or through control of the
corporation's financial and managerial capabilities, the Service will
be prone to view the position as a forbidden interest. Only the po-
sition of trustee, which still permits substantial influence to be ex-
ercised over the future of a corporation's stock, has been excepted
by the Service through the revenue rulings. The Service allows this
exception only because the trustee's duties and responsibilities are
tightly controlled by law.58
The ability to control the stock of a corporation is crucial in de-
termining a forbidden interest under Treasury Regulation section
1.302-4(e)." That section allows retention of a valid creditor inter-
est after redemption. It stipulates that any assets of the corpora-
tion acquired in the enforcement of the creditor's rights are not
considered an acquisition of an interest in the corporation. It is
important to note that the same section prohibits the acquisition
of the stock of the corporation, of its parent corporation, or of a
subsidiary of the corporation in such circumstances. This prohibi-
tion is particularly important if the distributee receives promissory
notes from a redeeming corporation experiencing financiil difficul-
56. 1972-2 C.B. 201.
57. Id.
58. Undoubtedly, only a few positions, such as a trustee or a receiver in bankruptcy,
would have such control over the corporation's stock while maintaining such legal standards
and defined duties to make them acceptable to the Service.
59. (1978).
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ties. If the redeeming corporation applies for a reorganization, and
the trustee decides to continue corporate operations, a reorganiza-
tion of the capital structure will be necessary. 0 Unfortunately, the
distributee may find that the trustee suggests conversion of prom-
issory notes into common stock. If the court accepts the trustee's
plan, the distributee's promissory notes will be converted into
stock. If this occurs within ten years of the redemption, the entire
proceeds of the redemption will be retroactively taxed as a divi-
dend under section 301.
Section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) only requires that the distributee not ac-
quire a forbidden interest within ten years of the redemption.
Other family members, whose stock ownership would ordinarily be
attributed to the distributee under section 318(a)(1)(A), may ac-
quire interests in the redeeming corporation without affecting the
status of the distributee. Revenue Ruling 71-562 clarifies the posi-
tion of the Service in this regard.6 In this ruling, a father com-
pletely terminated his interest by redeeming all of his stock. His
son continued as a shareholder in the redeeming corporation. The
father met all the necessary conditions of section 302(c)(2) to
waive the family attribution rules. Within ten years of the redemp-
tion, a second son purchased shares in the redeeming corporation.
The Service held that the father did not acquire a forbidden inter-
est by way of his son's purchase of stock from the original redeem-
ing corporation. The Service stated that the acquisition discussed
in section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) refers to an interest as outlined in sec-
tion 302(c)(2)(A)(i) and that this interest is to be determined with-
out regard to the application of the family attribution rules of sec-
tion 318(a)(1). In sum, any interest acquired in the ten-year period
following the redemption, which would ordinarily be attributable
to the distributee due to the family attribution rules of section
318(a)(1), is disregarded for purposes of section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). 2
This interpretation of section 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) can potentially de-
feat the broad aim of section 302(c)(2). That aim is a total sever-
ing of any interest in the redeeming corporation to insure that the
distributee will no longer have a reason or the ability to control the
corporatibn's stock. Under Revenue Ruling 71-562, a distributee's
spouse can retain a controlling stock interest in the corporation
while the distributee receives capital gains treatment on his re-
60. This would be the probable path chosen if the receiver determines that a corpora-
tion's going-concern value exceeds its liquidated value.
61. 1971-2 C.B. 173.
62. Id. at 174.
[Vol. 8:59
OPPORTUNITIES AND PITFALLS
demption. Realistically, the distributee may still have substantial
control over corporate policies and decisions through the spouse
who remains a shareholder. For example, a husband may retain
eighty percent of a corporation's stock while his spouse, who is in-
timate with market trends, completely redeems her shares. The
husband may receive financial guidance from his wife and essen-
tially be a conduit for her corporate control due to the closeness of
the marital relationship. It should be recalled, however, that Reve-
nue Ruling 71-562, which apparently allows this situation to occur,
dealt only with a stock interest.6 " The Service has yet to address
the question of continued control of a corporation by a distributee
through a spouse who retains a nonstock interest.6 4
The flush language following section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) states that
if a distributee does acquire a forbidden interest within ten years
of the distribution, the statutes of limitation established in sec-
tions 6501 and 6502 are suspended."5 The Service has one year
from the date it is notifed by the distributee of the acquisition of
the interest in which to assess and collect the tax due or to begin
court proceedings to collect the tax. Since the distributee must no-
tify the Service of the acquisition in a statement accompanying his
return, the Service should have no trouble detecting a deficiency
and initiating assessment and collection proceedings within the
one-year period. 6
63. It should follow that nonstock interests acquired by family members would also be
disregarded for purposes of § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) as § 302(c)(2)(A)(i) specifically enumerates
nonstock interests and § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) incorporates those interests by use of the phrase
"any such interest." If this can be assumed, then a disributee can maintain direct control of
a corporation if the spouse remains in an upper echelon corporate position, such as presi-
dent or chairman of the board.
64. In 1958, however, the Advisory Group on Subchapter C recommended that a com-
plete termination of shareholder's interest would have to include a complete termination of
the interest of the shareholder's spouse:
It is felt that, because of the close relationship between husband and wife, it is not
clear that the distributee ceases to have an interest in the corporation if his
spouse continues as a shareholder. Frequently, he can, through the continuing
stock interest of his spouse, still maintain an effective voice in the management of
the corporation.
REVISED REPORT, supra note 49, at 6.
65. I.R.C. § 6501 provides generally for a three-year period of limitation on the assess-
ment of tax by the Service. No assessment or court proceeding without assessment may be
commenced outside of the three-year limitation. The section also provides further instruc-
tions and limitations for differing types of returns. I.R.C. § 6502 allows a six-year period of
limitation on the collection of an assessed tax or the commencement of a court action to
collect an assessed tax.
66. This flush language, allowing an extra year for assessment, places a heavy burden on
the taxpayer. A forbidden interest acquired on the last day of the ten-year period may cause
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IV. SECTION 302(c)(2)(A)(iii)
The third requirement necessary for suspension of family attri-
bution rules is stipulated in section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii). This section
requires that the distributee file an agreement to notify the Secre-
tary of the Treasury of an acquisition of a forbidden interest. The
Secretary is given the regulatory power to prescribe the time and
manner of the filing. 7 The regulations provide that the agreement
must be a separate statement in duplicate which must be signed by
the distributee and attached to the first return filed by him for the
taxable year in which he terminates his interest as described in
section 302(b)(3).8'
Although the filing requirement of 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) seems
strictly procedural and rigid, the history of litigation and the treas-
ury regulation indicate otherwise. The original regulation fleshing
out the code provision did not provide for much flexibility.6 9
Treasury Decision 753570 however, added flexibility to the strict
mandate of filing. This decision allows the district director to grant
a reasonable time extension for filing of the agreement, provided
the distributee's request for an extension is timely and the distrib-
reassessment of the distributee's tax which was payable on a distribution that occurred up
to eleven years earlier.
67. See note 5 supra. The section also requires the distributee to retain all records as
may be necessary for the application of § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii).
68. Rev. Rul. 71-138, 1971-1 C.B. 109. In a community property state when the distribu-
tee/spouse redeems stock and wishes to have the waiver of family attribution rules under §
302(c)(2) apply, both spouses must file the notification agreement specified in §
302(c)(2)(A)(iii). Id. at 109.
69. Before 1979, the relevant part of the regulation read:
(a)(1) The agreement specified in section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) shall be in the form of
a separate statement in duplicate signed by the distributee and attached to the
first return filed by the distributee for the taxable year in which the distribution
described in section 302(b)(3) occurs. The agreement shall recite that the distribu-
tee has not acquired, other than by bequest or inheritance, any interest in the
corporation (as described in section 302(c)(2)(A)(i)) since the distribution and
that the distributee agrees to notify the district director for the internal revenue
district in which the distributee resides of any acquisition, other than by bequest
or inheritance, of such an interest in the corporation within 10 days after the ac-
quisition, if the acquisition occurs within 10 years from the date of the
distribution.
(b) The distributee who files an agreement under section 302(c)(A)(iii) shall
retain copies of income tax returns and any other records indicating fully the
amount of tax which would have been payable had the redemption been treated as
a distribution subject to section 301.
Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(a)(1), (b)(1978).
70. 1978-1 C.B. 84.
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utee can show a reasonable cause for failure to file the agreement."1
This amendment is reflected in the current treasury regulation. 72
Treasury Decision 7535 was issued to bring Treasury Regulation
section 1.302-4(a)(1) and (2) more into line with court decisions
which allowed a time extension for filing.7" In United States v.
G. W. Van Keppel,74 the court held that the Director of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service abused his discretion by rejecting an agree-
ment which was filed late due to inadvertence. The submission of
the agreement with an amended return preceded the deficiency as-
sessment. The court found the language of section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii)
directory rather than mandatory and stated: "The interests of the
government have not been jeopardized. The Commissioner has
been neither misled nor inconvenienced. '7 5
Following the decision in Van Keppel, the courts routinely
71. Id.
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-4(a)(1)-(b) (1979) provides:
(a)(1) The agreement specified in section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) shall be in the form
of a separate statement in duplicate signed by the distributee and attached to the
first return filed by the distributee for the taxable year in which the distribution
described in section 302(b)(3) occurs. The agreement shall recite that the distribu-
tee has not acquired, other than by bequest or inheritance, any interest in the
corporation (as described in section 302(c)(2)(A)(i)) since the distribution and
that the distributee agrees to notify the district director for the internal revenue
district in which the distributee resides of any acquisition, other than by bequest
or inheritance, of such an interest in the corporation within 30 days after the ac-
quisition, if the acquisition occurs within 10 years from the date of the
distribution.
(2) If the distributee fails to file the agreement specified in section
302(c)(2)(A)(iii) at the time provided in subparagraph (1) of this paragraph, then
the district director for the internal revenue district in which the distributee re-
sided at the time of filing the first return for the taxable year in which the distri-
bution occurred shall grant a reasonable extension of time for filing such agree-
ment, provided (i) it is established to the satisfaction of the district director that
there was reasonable cause for failure to file the agreement within the prescribed
time and (ii) a request for such extension is filed within such time as the district
director considers reasonable under the circumstances.
(b) The distributee who files an agreement under section 302(c)(A)(iii) shall
retain copies of income tax returns and any other records indicating fully the
amount of tax which would have been payable had the redemption been treated as
a distribution subject to section 301.
73. Section 1.302-4(a) is amended to conform the present rules governing the time
for filing an agreement with certain court decisions which have held that an un-
timely filing of the agreement does not preclude the distributee from applying
section 302(c)(2)(A) to the redemption where reasonable cause for failure to file a
timely agreement can be shown.
1978-1 C.B. at 84.
74. 321 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1963).
75. Id. at 720.
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granted time extensions in cases where the agreement was not filed
due to inadvertence.76 Similarly, the Service later issued private
letter rulings allowing section 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) agreements to be
filed late, some as late as four years." Finally, on March 14, 1978,
the Service issued Treasury Decision 5735, which updated Treas-
ury Regulation section 1.302-4(a) to its present status.
The stated purpose of the Service's regulation amendment is to
conform the regulation to the rationale of previous court holdings.
The cases and private letter rulings almost uniformly have allowed
a late filing of the agreement where the noncompliance was inad-
vertent. Similarly, the courts have rejected late filings where the
filing came after an adverse court decision 78 or where a change of
the distributee's plans forced a redemption to conform to a section
302(b)(3) termination of interest transaction which necessitated
compliance with section 302(c)(2).79 The district director, in deter-
mining the propriety of a late filing, should look to case law as a
guide for his decision. Therefore, when applying to the district di-
rector for a time extension, a distributee stands the best chance of
receiving an extension if the filing deadline was inadvertently
missed.80
V. SECTION 302(c)(2)(B)(i)-(ii)
Section 302(c)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) impose the final requirements
which must be met in order to waive the family attribution rules of
76. See, e.g., Pearce v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 702 (W.D.N.Y. 1964); Niedermeyer v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 280 (1974), aff'd per curiam, 535 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1977); Cary v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 214 (1963).
See also Rickey v. United States, 427 F. Supp. 484 (W.D. La. 1976), in which the Tax
Court allowed an estate to file a tax agreement for the deceased distributee some five years
after the stock distribution.
77: See Private Letter Ruling 7830001, Private Letter Ruling 7826005, and Private Let-
ter Ruling 7906007.
78. See Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 398 (1973); Fehrs Fin. Co. v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 174 (1972), aff'd, 2 U.S. Tax Cases 82,485 (1973).
79. See Archbold v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 329 (D.N.J. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 311
F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1963).
80. Even though under the newly amended regulation a distributee may still bring a suit
charging abuse of discretion by the district director in not allowing late filing of an agree-
ment, the amendments seem to give more credence to the decision of the district director.
See Treas. Reg. § 1-302-4(a)(2) (1978). Probably only cases not dealing with an inadvertency
will reach the courts. The Service will have a stronger position in appealed cases since the
district director's refusal of a time extension will come after the distributee has presented
his arguments to the district director, and the regulation's standard of "reasonableness" has
been applied to the distributee's contentions.
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section 318(a)(1).81 Two criteria must be satisfied. First, the re-
deemed shareholder must not have acquired any part of the re-
deemed stock from a person or entity whose stock ownership
would be attributable to the redeemed shareholder under the rules
of section 318. This prohibition only applies to stock acquired in
the ten-year period immediately before the redemption. Second,
the redeeming shareholder must not have transferred any stock in
the redeeming corporation to any person or entity whose stock
ownership would be attributable to the redeeming shareholder
under the rules of section 318, unless those shares transferred are
redeemed in the same transaction. Again this prohibition only ap-
plies to stock transferred in the ten-year period immediately prior
to redemption. These two criteria need not be satisfied, however, if
the distributee can establish that the acquisition or transfer of
stock did not have as a principal purpose the avoidance of federal
income tax.
Sections 302(c)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) seek to prevent transfers in an-
ticipation of redemption, whereby a distributee could maintain a
substantial interest in and control of the corporation through the
stock ownership of a family member while simultaneously receiv-
ing capital gains treatment of the redemption proceeds.
The Service adopts a practical approach to allowing certain
types of stock transfers which occur within the ten-year period
before redemption. In particular, the Service consistently allows a
stock transfer which passes control of a corporation to a child of
the redeeming stockholder, even when it occurs within the ten-year
period prescribed in the Code. For example, in Revenue Ruling 56-
556, a husband and wife sold a portion of their stock to their son
and redeemed the remainder, thereby providing their son with a
controlling interest in the family corporation.2 The Service held
that the transfer of stock did not have as a principal purpose the
avoidance of federal income tax. Consequently, the transfer to a
section 318 party did not defeat the parents' attempt to qualify
under section 302(c)(2) for waiver of family attribution rules. The
Service has also held that under some circumstances an acquisition
by a distributee within ten years of a redemption would not defeat
a section 302(c)(2) exemption attempt. In Revenue ruling 56-584, a
father, the president and major shareholder of a corporation, made
a gift of stock to his son five years before a redemption in order to
81. See note 5 supra.
82. 1956-2 C.B. 177.
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encourage the son's interest in the business.83 After working for the
corporation for five years, the son redeemed his stock and at-
tempted to waive the family attribution rules under section
302(c)(2). The Service held that "because the gift of stock from
father to son was made for bona fide business reasons and there
was at the time of the gift no plan to effect a redemption of the
stock, the avoidance of income tax was not a principal purpose of
the gift."8 ' Hence, in this ruling the Service established two in-
dicators, a bona fide business purpose and a lack of intent at the
time of the transfer to effect a redemption, which it used to deter-
mine if tax avoidance was the principal purpose of the transfer.
A final indicator used to establish whether the avoidance of fed-
eral income tax was a principal purpose of the transfer was added
by Revenue Ruling 57-387.85 In the revenue ruling, three sons ac-
quired stock in a corporation through gifts from their parents and
distributions from an estate. The sons, desiring to terminate their
interest in the corporation, sold a portion of the shares to their
father and had the rest redeemed by the corporation." The Service
held that the transfer did not have as its principal purpose the
avoidance of federal income tax and that the only purpose for the
sale was to assure the termination of the sons' interests. The Ser-
vice stated that the tax result would be the same regardless of how
the sons' interests were terminated. The Service reasoned that
similar tax results indicated the absence of a tax avoidance motive.
The logic of the Service in Revenue Ruling 51-387 seems dubious
at best. This reasoning assumes no tax avoidance purposes for the
transfer. Clearly, if there was a motive to avoid federal income tax,
the requirements of the flush language following section
302(c)(2)(B)(ii) would not be met and the redemption proceeds
would be classified as dividends. Accordingly, the tax result would
be dramatically different. Unfortunately, the Service chose to use
circuitous reasoning by incorporating an unfounded assumption
into the tax avoidance test.
83. 1956-2 C.B. 179.
84. Id. at 180.
85. 1957-2 C.B. 225.
86. Both sons also desired to waive the family attribution rules under § 302(c)(2). Id.
87. In the instant case, all of the parties to the disposition of stock are adults. The
only purpose of the sale of part of the distributees' stock to their father is to
assure the termination of their interest in the corporation. The same tax result
will obtain regardless of how their interest is terminated, so that tax avoidance is
not considered to be one of the principal purposes of the disposition.
Id. at 226.
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In an apparent attempt to move away from the rigid tests enun-
ciated in past revenue rulings, the Service in 1977 issued Revenue
Ruling 77-293. 81 This ruling dealt with the now routine procedure
whereby the shareholder makes a gift of a majority of his shares to
his child prior to redemption of his remaining shares in order to
insure transfer of corporate control to the child after redemption.
In promulgating the new ruling, the Service apparently concluded
that a case-by-case approach was better suited to determine tax
avoidance than was the three-factor method used in the past. The
Service stated: "Whether one of the principal purposes of an ac-
quisition or disposition of stock is tax avoidance within the mean-
ing of section 302(c)(2)(B) of the Code can be determined only by
an analysis of all of the facts and circumstances of a particular
situation." 9
While the transfer of stock by the distributee to the distributee's
child, within ten years of a redemption, to effect transfer of corpo-
rate control will probably continue to be allowed by the Service, it
seems improbable that a transfer of stock to a spouse within ten
years of a redemption will be allowed."' Note, however, that ac-
cording to the regulations, a transfer of stock within the ten-year
period prior to redemption will not be indicative of tax avoidance
merely because the transferee is in a lower income tax bracket
than the transferor.9 1 Rather, any ruling by the Service that a
transfer to a spouse within ten years of a redemption is for tax
avoidance purposes will be based on the possible retention of cor-
porate control by the distributee through the transferee spouse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 302(c)(2) is in a state of flux. Many allowances and ex-
ceptions are hidden behind the innocuous and seemingly inflexible
language of the Code. Wise use of these allowances and exceptions
can result in highly favorable tax consequences. The crucial task is
to tread the fine line between the spirit of the section and its judi-
88. 1977-2 C.B. 91.
89. Id. at 92. The only revenue ruling issued since Rev. Rul. 77-293 is Rev. Rul. 77-455,
1977-2 C.B. 357, which deals again with a transfer of stock to the distributee's child within
ten years of the redemption to affect a transfer of control. There, the Service merely cites
Rev. Rul. 77-293 without any extensive reasoning offered for the decision. Hopefully, this
ruling does not herald a return to the Service's original practice of issuing a ruling without
stating any substantive reasons for the holding.
90. See Rev. Rul. 77-293, 1977-2 C.B. 91.
91. Treas. Reg. 1-302-4(g)(2) (1978).
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cial interepretation. If this line can be found and used as a guide,
the spoils of tax savings lie at the end of the journey.
